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PROFITING FROM ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES? 
 
Abstract 
How to profit from innovation has been an important question for both innovation scholars and 
practitioners over the years. It is certainly a relevant question for all types of technological innovation, 
including emerging ones. Teece's (1986) profiting from innovation (PFI) framework sets forth a theory of 
the relevant contingencies. However, Teece's framework focuses on technologies with applications in 
specific domains. We focus on the question of how to profit from enabling technologies: technologies that 
are applicable across multiple domains. We argue that capturing value in such circumstances is 
fundamentally different from profiting from less-enabling technologies and raises new issues with respect 
to the relevant business models and public policies. This paper's contribution is threefold. It formally 
revises and extends the original PFI framework to include the case of enabling technologies; it provides 
empirical evidence to support the distinction between profiting from enabling as compared to profiting 
from narrower "discrete" technologies; and it generates perspectives on the appropriate business models 
for these technologies and discusses related public-policy implications, in light of the fact that the share of 
the benefits the innovator can capture is likely to be even smaller for enabling than for discrete 
technologies. 
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I. Introduction 
How to profit from innovation remains an important question for innovation scholars, practitioners, and 
policymakers. It is a relevant question for all types of technological innovation, including emerging ones. 
A touchstone for research in this context is the seminal work by Teece (1986, 2006, 2018a, 2018b), who 
develops a comprehensive theory of the factors that impact the division of the gains from innovation. 
Teece focuses on a key question: under what conditions should an innovator sell or license its invention to 
producers of goods and services, as opposed to becoming a producer of goods or services himself or 
herself (i.e., integrating the innovation into a product or a service for the final customer)? Teece's 
profiting from innovation (PFI) framework has guided academics and practitioners in understanding the 
problem for more than thirty years. It has also informed public policy by emphasizing that capturing value 
from innovation depends on not just intellectual property, but also the availability and ownership of 
complementary assets and complementary technologies, supporting the evolution of standards, and 
getting timing right (Teece, 1986, 2006). 
In this paper, we suggest that crucial aspects of the appropriability problem are not captured 
adequately by the PFI 1986 framework. One feature of Teece's initial framework is its clearly articulated 
applicability to a "discrete" invention with narrow downstream applicability: "a new product design 
concept" (Teece, 1986, p.291). Here, we suggest that at least one important category of technology (i.e., 
enabling technologies) will not fit comfortably in the framework and requires further analysis and 
modifications to the framework. Enabling technologies are upgradable, adaptable technologies with 
improvement potential that have broad applicability (see Rosenberg, 1963; Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 
1995; Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998; Teece, 2018a; Conti et al., 2019a). Enabling technologies are 
found in many contexts, ranging from computer science algorithms to lasers to chemicals. For example, 
some artificial intelligence algorithms are specifically targeted to an application; others, more general or 
enabling, can be used in genetics, robotics, or natural language applications. Similarly, some types of 
lasers can be used only in specific applications such as dermatology; the more enabling lasers, instead, 
have broader applicability across diverse settings such as dermatology, industrial machinery, and military. 
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We argue that understanding how firms can profit from enabling technologies is important because 
of emerging management and policy issues associated with breakthrough enabling technologies, such as 
blockchain, artificial intelligence, and 5G wireless communication, which are likely to have massive 
impacts on business and society. Profiting from enabling technologies is fundamentally different from 
profiting from more narrowly applicable ones (see also Teece, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).  
From a private perspective, recognizing the specialized challenges of profiting from enabling 
technologies leads to the identification of the business models that may allow the inventor of an enabling 
technology to capture value from it (Leih & Teece, 2017; Teece, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). This is crucial for 
the design of a policy system that can ensure that this type of innovation is encouraged (Arrow, 1962; 
Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Winter, 2006; Schumpeter, 1950).  
This paper's contribution is threefold. First, it contextualizes the problem of profiting from 
innovation for the case of enabling technologies (section II). Second, using the Patval survey of inventors 
(Torrisi et al., 2016; Hoisl & Mariani, 2016) in combination with other datasets, it provides empirical 
evidence on the distinction between discrete and enabling technologies when profiting from innovation 
(section III). Third, it systematically revises and extends the original PFI framework with particular 
consideration of enabling technologies (section IV). Finally, it offers reflections for strategic management 
researchers and practitioners as well as policymakers regarding profiting from enabling technologies 
(section V).  
 
II. Extending the Profiting from Innovation Framework to Enabling Technologies 
 
Teece's seminal 1986 article focused on an important question: how should the configuration of strategic 
and organizational activities of innovators—including the innovators' business models—be designed to 
increase the chance that the innovators themselves (rather than imitators and other followers) appropriate 
returns from their R&D investments? Teece (1986) developed what has become known as the profiting 
from innovation (PFI) framework, a simple and elegant conceptual model that identified the contingencies 
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for profiting from innovation in different settings. It represented a turning point compared to the industrial 
organization and technology management approaches that preceded it. It brought attention to the fact that, 
despite policymakers' efforts to create mechanisms to assist innovators, history is replete with examples 
of innovators who have never been able to appropriate the economic returns from their innovations, and 
imitators who achieved commercial success ahead—if not instead—of the innovators.  
In this paper, we emphasize that the PFI theory requires further elucidation to be able to embrace 
the idiosyncratic characteristics of enabling technologies. Enabling technologies are both expandable and 
adaptable technologies (Teece, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; see also Conti et al., 2019a and b, who refer to them 
as to "general technologies"). They are more general than "discrete" (narrowly applicable) technologies 
and can impact multiple market segments. Examples of enabling technologies are available in today's 
economy. For instance, artificial intelligence algorithms can be applied to a wide variety of contexts (e.g., 
to understand speech, recognize faces, and drive vehicles). In mobile telecoms, 3G and 4G technology 
might be thought of as enabling technologies, with mobility for applications such as Facebook, location-
sensitive mapping, and streaming media (Teece, 2018a, p.1369).  
The concept of enabling technologies builds on the related concept of general purpose technologies 
(Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998). Enabling technologies can be 
thought of as "junior GPTs" in that they share with GPTs the characteristic of being applicable across 
domains, but their breadth of application is not necessarily so high that it has a measurable impact on the 
economic growth of the entire economy.1 
Superficially, the broad applicability of enabling technologies suggests that these technologies offer 
more opportunities for various parties to capture returns (i.e., they generate more value and profits for 
various institutions than do discrete technologies). However, their very breadth of applicability makes 
even partial value appropriation by the innovator difficult (see also Teece, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). Put 
                                                 
1 The degree of "applicability" that characterizes enabling technologies can be thought of as a varying on a continuum (Conti et al., 2019a and b). 
In this work, for simplicity, we focus on the two extremes of this spectrum and compare and contrast the case of very general and broadly 
applicable "enabling technologies" with the case of narrowly applicable "discrete" technologies. 
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differently, while the opportunity for value capture may be high because of the tremendous value 
generated, the innovators' ability to capture a fair share of the value generated is even more limited than 
for discrete technologies, raising both managerial challenges and public-policy issues.  
It is important to understand the nature of the value appropriation challenge associated with 
enabling technologies. Compared to a discrete technology, a more general technology like an enabling 
technology leads an innovator to face two critical tradeoffs (Conti et al., 2019a). The first is what we call 
the "design cost/applicability tradeoff," concerning the fact that an enabling technology might require 
additional design work for its development and fine-tuning across settings, increasing the overall costs 
faced by the innovator (Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998; Teece, 2018a, 2018b). This implies a tradeoff 
between enjoying the economies of scope that broader applicability enables and incurring the extra costs 
for designing the technology so that it is more applicable in the first place.  
A second, related, and critical tradeoff is what we call the "value/applicability tradeoff." A more 
enabling technology is adaptable to a larger number of markets, but that higher applicability comes at the 
cost of it being tuned less perfectly to each individual market (e.g., Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; 
Bresnahan & Gambardella, 1998). For instance, lasers that have applicability for industrial drilling and 
dermatology tend to be less fine-tuned to either of these two settings than other lasers that are applicable 
only in dermatology. As the value generated for the end user is typically associated with its willingness to 
pay, this has an impact on the profitability of enabling technologies. It is worth noting that these two 
tradeoffs could be intertwined. Lower design costs in some cases might be associated with lower value 
across settings; and the willingness to improve the fit of the technology across different settings could 
lead to higher design costs. This could also depend on the other characteristics of the technology. For 
instance, a more complex technology (i.e. a technology composed of many interdependent components) 
might require much higher design costs so that the fit across different settings could be improved, which 
would have an impact on the economics of profiting from it. 
Overall, these two tradeoffs make quite different the economics of profiting from enabling versus 
discrete technologies. Revising the original PFI framework to adapt it to the case of enabling technologies 
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is, therefore, important. The original PFI framework focused on three core factors that determined the 
innovator’s response to the profiting from innovation problem: the existence of a dominant design, the 
strength of the appropriability regime, and the availability of complementary assets. We note that the 
emergence of a dominant design, and the possible associated agreement on dominant standards, might be 
problematic in the case of enabling technologies. This is because the emergence of a dominant design 
may require coordination of players upstream and downstream across multiple markets, which tends to be 
difficult for enabling technologies (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995). When vertical integration is absent, 
the technology innovator and independent downstream parties might end up investing "too little, too late," 
limiting the effectiveness with which the design of the enabling technology can be successfully developed 
(Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995, p.83). However, in this paper, we will focus our analysis on the strength 
of the appropriability regime and the availability of complementary assets as the two key factors that 
distinguish profiting from enabling and discrete technologies.  
The PFI framework suggests that the appropriability regime (i.e., environmental factors that govern 
an innovator's ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation, such as the nature of the 
technology and efficacy of legal mechanisms of protection) plays a key role in determining the ability of 
innovators to profit from innovation. At first glance, one might conclude that the role of the strength of 
the appropriability regime would not change between enabling or discrete technologies, as it is mostly 
associated with the intrinsic characteristics of the technology and not dependent on the number of its 
applications. For instance, it could be argued that a chemical compound could be successfully protected 
by a strong patent, and that it would not matter whether that compound could be used only as a drug or 
whether it could be used in three different applications (for instance as a pharmaceutical compound, a 
chemical reagent, and an agricultural compound), as patent protection would be equally effective (or 
ineffective) across domains.  
However, closer examination suggests that the actual strength of the appropriability regime might 
differ across domains where the technology is applicable. For instance, imagine an inventor operating in a 
strong appropriability regime and applying for a patent to protect an enabling technology. Theoretically, 
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the inventor's patent document should be written in a way so that the patent’s claims cover all the possible 
applications of the invention across domains. But this would be true only under the assumption that all the 
possible applications of the inventions are known (or could be identified easily by) the inventor at the 
time of the patent application (i.e., Merges & Nelson, 1990, 1994; Novelli, 2015). This is unlikely to 
happen because there is high uncertainty regarding the application domains at the time in which enabling 
technologies emerge (Rosenberg, 1998).  
In practice, the extent of protection that the patent will give to the inventor depends on the 
inventor's ability to identify early on as many applications of the invention as possible and have those 
applications covered by the patent claims so that they are all protected effectively (Novelli, 2015). Doing 
so requires complementary technical and commercial knowledge across all the domains of application, 
which the inventor and retained patent attorneys might lack. Also, the extent of protection will be 
dependent ultimately on the innovator’s ability to monitor potential infringers closely and pursue them 
legally; but this is difficult when the patent holder's attention needs to be spread across all domains in 
which the enabling technology could be applied (e.g., Merges & Nelson, 1994; Chang, 1995; Novelli, 
2015). It follows that—even when operating under a strong appropriability regime––innovators who have 
developed an enabling technology might not be able to capitalize on the invention fully.2  
The case of weak appropriability regime is worth reflecting upon. One way to compensate for a 
weak appropriability regime in Teece (1986) is for innovators to possess (or have competitive access to) 
the complementary assets and technologies that need to be combined with the innovation to bring it to the 
market. The PFI framework, therefore, ties successful value appropriation to the ownership of 
complementary assets and technologies, except where intellectual property rights are strong, implying a 
kind of substitution effect between the strength of the appropriability regime and the possession of 
complementary assets and technologies.  
                                                 
2 In line with this argument, Novelli (2015) finds that firms with patents whose claims span across multiple technological classes (possibly 
associated with a more enabling technology) tend to be associated with a lower ability of the inventor to appropriate value from their invention 
compared to other firms (as measured by the proportion of self-forward citations to total forward citations received by the patent). 
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But in the case of an enabling technology, this precept must apply across multiple application areas. 
The challenge for the owner of the enabling technology is that complementary assets are often slow to 
build or expensive to acquire, and the diversity and amount of assets required to market a technology 
across different sectors constitutes a substantial barrier to the appropriation of returns for the owners of 
the technology (Conti et al., 2019a, 2019b).  
Few innovators ever end up being in the actual position to appropriate value from the enabling 
technology via downstream entry in just one application sector (Teece, 1986), let alone all application 
sectors.3 A key example of an innovator with an enabling technology is Echelon, a Silicon Valley startup 
company that in 1990 launched LonWorks, a networking technology that offered a universal 
technological solution in the context of automation systems. Although every automation system is 
essentially based on three components (sensor, controller, and actuator), the main applications of 
automations were characterized historically by industry-specific technical paradigms and know-how 
(Thoma, 2008). The solution advanced by Echelon was more generally applicable and could address 
automation across different industries. The company’s initial business model targeted every automation 
system market at that time, including buildings, process industries, manufacturing, home automation, 
transportations, and utilities (Thoma, 2008). But Echelon lacked the required set of complementary assets 
across sectors. While tens of millions of devices in a variety of industries use LonWorks standards, 
Echelon struggled to capture more of the value it created and was acquired by another company for $45 
million in 2018 (Echelon Corporation, 2018). 
 
III. Profiting from Enabling Technologies: Illustrative Evidence 
We provide empirical evidence in support of the arguments presented, as the limited availability of cross-
industry data on firms' commercialization strategies makes it difficult to test our arguments fully. A key 
                                                 
3 Nelson (1959) came close to articulating this point. He saw the scope of the business assets held by the firm as important to value capture 
because of uncertainty as to where the fruits of basic science would likely fall. What is true for basic research is also somewhat true for enabling 
technologies. 
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point that we illustrate empirically is that "discrete" and enabling technologies display different patterns 
and associations among the variables of the PFI framework. When the technology is discrete, the pattern 
we observe reproduces the classical profiting from innovation prediction. However, for the case of 
enabling technologies, the outcome is more varied.  
 
Data  
Combining data from multiple sources, we created a comprehensive and representative dataset at 
the invention level, in line with the PFI framework. We started from the Patval survey of inventors 
(Torrisi et al., 2016; Hoisl & Mariani 2016), which collects unique information on the characteristics of 
the inventors and their inventions and whether they were used in-house or commercialized. The Patval 
survey has been assembled by contacting and surveying inventors in Europe, using a harmonized 
questionnaire, across surveyed regions. The sample was drawn at the level of patent applications with 
priority dates between 2003 and 2005.4 For each European patent listed in the survey, we selected those 
that had a US patent equivalent using the European Patent Office Patstat database. We combined these 
data with data from the Patstat, the US Patent Office PatentsView datasets, and industry-level (from the 
Carnegie Mellon Survey, Cohen et al., 2000)5 and country-level data on the quality of national legal 
systems (Fraser Institute Index6).   
 
Methodology and variables’ operationalization 
The purpose of our analysis was, first, to show evidence of the associations among variables discussed in 
the PFI framework in our full sample of patents; and, second, to show how those patterns differed for 
enabling and discrete technologies.  
                                                 
4 2003 was used as a lower bound of the priority years to avoid too much overlap with two inventor surveys conducted in the US and Japan 
(which used priority years between 1995 and 2003). 2005 was chosen as an upper bound, since Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) filings only 
enter the regional phase thirty months following the priority date. Choosing patent applications with later priority years would have led to biases 
due to “missing” PCT filings. After sampling the patents, one inventor listed on the patent document was chosen at random to respond to the 
survey. 
5 We thank Wes Cohen for providing access to these data. 
6 Available at www.fraserinstitute.org 
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We used two variables to identify firm's commercialization choices. This is because, in line with 
the PFI framework, we identified two main (non-mutually exclusive) ways to commercialize the 
technology: commercialization via contract (i.e., licensing or patent sale) and integration of the 
technology into products (see also Conti et al., 2019a). In line with this logic, we modelled the firm's 
choice using a Bivariate Probit model to predict the probabilities that the inventor of a focal patent would 
choose to profit from the invention via (1) contracting (i.e., by selling or licensing the technology) and/or 
(2) integration, as a function of (i) the strength of the appropriability regime in the inventor's focal 
industry; (ii) the inventor's access to complementary assets; (iii) interaction between the strength of the 
appropriability regime in the focal industry and the inventor's access to complementary assets;7 and (iv) 
whether the design underlying the patent had reached the paradigmatic phase and a set of controls. Table 
1 presents variable operationalization and Table 2 summary statistics and pairwise correlations among 
variables.  
-----Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here----- 
Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the Bivariate Probit model. Models 1 and 2 report the results on the full 
sample of 7,290 inventions. They are in line with the predictions of the PFI framework: the strength of the 
legal appropriability regime was associated with the commercialization choice; in particular, consistent 
with the predictions of PFI, a stronger legal appropriability regime was associated with more technology 
contracting (=0.035, p-value<0.01) and less integration (=-0.018, p-value<0.01). The effect of the 
interaction between the availability of complementary assets and the strength of the appropriability 
regime is negative on contracting (=- 0.068, p-value<0.01), in line with Teece’s (1986) suggestion that 
when the appropriability regime is weak, access to complementary assets still can offer a way to profit 
from the technology via integration and protect the inventors against imitation.  
                                                 
7 The interaction term was included in the contracting equation only, in line with the intuition that availability of complementary assets makes 
contracting less likely even if appropriability is high, but that this dynamic is less relevant in the case of integration. Results (available upon 
request) are similar when the interaction term is included in both equations, but the interaction term is not statistically significant.  
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-----Insert Table 3 about here----- 
Results also report that the availability of complementary assets is positively associated with both 
contracting and integration of the technology (=0.891, p-value<0.01; =0.436, p-value<0.01, 
respectively). The positive association between the availability of complementary assets and 
commercialization via integration is straightforward. In our view, the positive association between the 
availability of complementary assets and commercialization via contracting is consistent with prior 
research that suggests that downstream capabilities support the upstream provider of a technology in 
negotiations with downstream buyers (Arora et al., 2001). Finally, results report that the technology being 
based on existing standards (i.e., paradigmatic phase) does not have a statistically significant impact on 
the contracting, but it is positively associated with integration (=0.304, p-value<0.01). This may be 
related to the fact that product commercialization is likely when standards are in place already. 
We then split the sample into the enabling and discrete technology patent subsamples. If we look at 
the subsample of discrete technologies (Models 3 and 4 in Table 3), the association between the strength 
of the appropriability regime and the commercialization choice shows a pattern similar to the one 
identified in the full sample (=0.050, p-value<0.01 on contracting and =-0.024, p-value<0.01 on 
integration). However, when we move to the sample of enabling technologies (Models 5 and 6 in Table 
3), the association between the strength of the appropriability regime and the commercialization choice 
varied, becoming statistically nonsignificant. Higher appropriability still makes contracting more likely, 
but the association is smaller and the standard error of the estimate is larger.  
Although these results do not represent a full test of our theory, they suggest that the strength of the 
appropriability regime is not clearly associated with the choice that the innovator of an enabling 
technology will make. When the strength of appropriability is high, innovators of an enabling technology 
do not take as much advantage compared to innovators endowed with a discrete technology, as the lack of 
the complementary knowhow and monitoring ability, and uncertainty over application, makes it difficult 
to use intellectual property effectively. When appropriability is weak, integration is less of a 
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straightforward option, because it is unlikely that any innovator can integrate across the broad set of 
application sectors to which an enabling technology gives access. In line with this, we find also that the 
interaction effect between the availability of complementary assets and the strength of the appropriability 
regime is less statistically significant for the innovator of an enabling technology (=- 0.067, p-
value<0.05). However, when we look at the availability of complementary assets, we do not see different 
patterns of results between enabling and discrete technologies. This is likely related to the fact that our 
measure might not be completely independent from whether the technology is enabling or discrete. This is 
unfortunately a limitation of our data. If an ideal measure were available, we would expect to see a pattern 
similar to the one that we find in the case of the appropriability regime. Finally, the fact that the 
technology is based on standards is not statistically significant in its association with contracting, but it is 
significant in its association with the choice of integrating, with a stronger effect in the case of enabling 
versus discrete technologies (=0.426, p-value<0.01 and =0.217, p-value<0.01). 
The average marginal effects, reported in Table 4, can offer a more precise understanding of the 
magnitude of the associations we observe and the comparison between discrete and enabling 
technologies. Results from the sample of discrete technologies (columns 3 and 4) show that—when 
complementary assets are not available—an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of the 
appropriability regime (2.337) is associated with an increase in the probability of contracting of about 1.9 
percentage points and with a decrease in the probability of integrating of about 2.1 percentage points. 
However, there is no statistically significant effect observed in the sample of enabling technologies 
(columns 5 and 6).  
-----Insert Table 4 about here----- 
 
When complementary assets are available, the association between appropriability and contracting 
is not significant in the sample of discrete technologies. However, an increase of one standard deviation in 
the strength of the appropriability regime is associated with a reduction in the probability of integration by 
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about 2.1 percentage points. In the sample enabling technologies, instead, the same increase of one 
standard deviation in the strength of the appropriability regime is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of contracting of 1.4 percentage points. Yet the strength of the appropriability regime is not 
associated with the probability of integrating in a statistically significant way.  
Focusing on the availability of complementary assets, in the sample of discrete technologies, when 
appropriability is low, the availability of complementary assets is associated with an increase in the 
probability of contracting of about 6 percentage points and an increase in the probability of integrating of 
about 16 percentage points. In the sample of enabling technologies instead, the same condition is 
associated with an increase of the probability of contracting of about 8 percentage points and an increase 
in the probability of integrating of 17 percentage points. In the sample of discrete technologies, when 
appropriability is high, the availability of complementary assets is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of contracting of about 13 percentage points and an increase in the probability of integrating 
of about 15 percentage points. In the sample of enabling technologies instead, the same condition is 
associated with a decrease of the probability of contracting of about 9 percentage points and an increase 
in the probability of integrating of 17 percentage points. This suggests that the availability of 
complementary assets is not associated with a large change in the probability of integrating, depending on 
whether the appropriability regime is strong or not. Consistently with the results presented earlier, the 
substitution effect between appropriability and complementary assets is higher when appropriability is 
high and seems more relevant for discrete technologies than for enabling ones.  
Concerning the paradigmatic phase, being in the post-dominant design period is not associated with 
a statistically significant change in the probability of contracting in the sample of discrete nor enabling 
technologies. However, it does have an effect on the probability of integration in both samples, where it is 
associated with an increase in probability by 8 and 16 percentage points, respectively. 
IV. Business Models for Innovators of Enabling Technologies: Narrow vs. Broad Horizontal 
Scope in Integration and Contracting 
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In the previous section, we offered preliminary empirical evidence of the distinction between 
profiting from enabling and discrete technologies. We now focus on the business models available to 
innovators of these technologies. The PFI framework defined the commercialization choice along the 
vertical dimension. It offered innovators (and, implicitly, imitators) clear advice on the choice between 
(i.) contracting out (licensing out or selling) the innovation to downstream firms, which then would 
embed it into products and sell it in the product market versus (ii) integrating the innovation into products 
to be sold on the product market. It essentially provided advice on the vertical scope that the innovator 
should consider when commercializing the technology.  
In considering the strategic options of an innovator with an enabling technology, it must be noted 
that the innovator's commercialization choice concerns not only the vertical scope of commercialization 
(whether to integrate or contract), but also the horizontal scope of commercialization. Innovators with an 
enabling technology potentially applicable across sectors must choose whether to target all or a vast 
portion of all possible application sectors (broad horizontal scope of commercialization); or to focus only 
on a few application sectors (narrow horizontal scope of commercialization). Considering this additional 
dimension leads to the identification of four possible strategies from which the innovator with an enabling 
technologies can choose: (iii) contracting with narrow horizontal scope, (iv) contracting with broad 
horizontal scope, (v) integration with narrow horizontal scope and (vi) integration with broad horizontal. 
These four additional strategies are available to innovators with an enabling technology. We graphically 
represent them in Figure 1, which also indicates the returns associated with each of these strategies in the 
relevant boxes. An innovator's returns can be represented as a function of V●, the value of the technology 
in each application sector (likely associated with the price that can be commanded); r●, the share of the 
rents that the innovator can appropriate in each application sector (with r●=1 in the case of integration) 
and n, the number of application sectors.  
Reflecting on the best strategy to profit from an enabling technology implies a comparison of the 
returns of each of the four different strategies associated with an enabling technology (iii-vi).  In the case 
of an enabling technology, targeting a higher n (broad scope of commercialization) can have a positive 
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effect on profits (absent any cash constraints), irrespective of whether the innovator contracts out the 
technology or integrates it into products. In this respect, given that the innovator has an enabling 
technology, the choice of a broad horizontal scope (strategies iv and vi) tends to be superior to that of a 
narrow horizontal scope (strategies iii and v).  
However, neither of these strategies is necessarily superior in terms of profits to strategies i and ii 
because, compared to a discrete technology, an enabling one likely creates lower value for customers in 
any given sector without adaptation due to the mentioned value/applicability tradeoff. In other words, it 
might have a decent performance in many settings, but its performance in each setting might be inferior to 
that of a discrete technology applicable only to (and fine-tuned for) one setting. Thus, in each individual 
setting, the value of the enabling technology could even be lower than the value of other available discrete 
ones (VEi<VD).  Due to the cost/applicability tradeoff, the threshold to achieve breakeven is likely higher 
as the innovator has likely incurred a higher cost for developing a more general enabling technology.  
In addition, even under a strong appropriability regime, the share of rent that the innovator of an 
enabling technology obtains when contracting in settings that are further away from core areas of 
expertise is likely lower than that that obtained in core domains of expertise (rEn < rEn-1 <…<rE1), due to 
the already mentioned lack of complementary skills and managerial capacity in application sectors that 
are further away from the innovator’s core areas of expertise. Therefore, for innovators with an enabling 
technology, contracting with a broad scope might be associated with decreasing marginal returns. This 
effect could be partially compensated by the fact that a broad horizontal scope might enable the innovator 
of an enabling technology to extract a higher share of rents from downstream players by putting them in 
competition with each other (rEi>rD if i>1). 
   
This discussion suggests that the actual profits accrued to an innovator will vary depending on the 
specific characteristics of the technology and the environment faced by the innovator that affect the actual 
value of the relevant parameters (e.g., actual extent of applicability of the technology, which determines 
n; actual strength of the appropriability regime, which determines r●; the complementary knowledge 
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available to the innovator, which determines the decrease of rEi as i increases;  and the reduction in value 
of the enabling technology compared with the alternative discrete technologies, which determines the 
difference between VEi and VD) and different strategies could be appropriate. 
-----Insert Figure 1 about here----- 
Teece's original framework particularly emphasized how the strategic choices of the innovator and 
the outcome of these choices vary depending on the availability of complementary assets and the strength 
of the appropriability regime. We extend the original analysis in Figure 2. Three classes of participants or 
"players" are of interest: innovators, imitators, and owners of cospecialized assets (e.g., distributors). The 
vertical axis, as in Teece (1986), measures how those who possess the technology (the innovator or 
possibly its imitators) are positioned vis a vis those firms that possess required specialized assets. The 
horizontal axis measures the "tightness" of the appropriability regime. Weak regimes are further 
subdivided according to how the innovator and imitators are positioned vis a vis each other.  
For discrete technologies, the original PFI framework emphasized that in the case of a strong 
appropriability regime, it is unlikely for firms other than the innovator to profit from the invention, 
therefore contracting (via technology licensing or selling) was an available strategy (cells 1 and 3). In the 
case of the enabling technology, contracting is still the best solution under a strong appropriability 
regime, but its success might be lower than in the case of a discrete technology for farther application 
domains (cells 2 and 4). This is even more problematic when the innovator is in a weak position vis a vis 
the owner of complementary assets (cell 4). Yet compared to the case of a discrete technology, the 
innovator with an enabling technology can choose among multiple application sectors where the 
technology could be applied. More options to choose from might improve the odds for the innovator.  
Even more critical is the case of a firm operating under a weak appropriability regime, particularly 
when innovators and imitators are positioned disadvantageously vis a vis the owners of complementary 
assets (cells 7 through 10). When the innovator is favorably positioned versus imitators with respect to 
commissioning complementary assets (cell 7), the original PFI framework recommends integration, 
which will result in positive returns for the innovator.  
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-----Insert Figure 2 about here----- 
In the case of an enabling technology (cell 9), integration is a less-profitable strategy. Integration is 
still the dominant strategy to protect the innovation; however, this strategy is likely to be less successful. 
This is due to the value/applicability and cost/applicability tradeoffs that characterize enabling 
technologies. To be applicable across settings, an enabling technology is likely to require higher design 
costs and be characterized by a lower unit value in each specific setting compared to technologies that 
have been fine tuned for that setting. With a higher fixed design cost and a lower value in each 
application, the pioneer's ability to profit adequately8 from an enabling technology is possible if the 
technology is applied across multiple settings (i.e., "broad horizontal scope of commercialization"). 
However, due to the high costs likely associated with the acquisition of complementary assets across 
diverse settings and the likely cash constraints, the innovator who chooses to integrate is likely to do it in 
a limited number of settings (i.e., "narrow horizontal scope of commercialization"). If so, the innovator 
could lose in each setting to firms with discrete technologies, which might be able to deliver more value 
to the users in those settings. The extent to which this is likely depends on how less valuable the enabling 
technology is compared to the alternative discrete technologies available in those settings.  
When the innovator is positioned poorly versus imitators with respect to commissioning 
complementary assets (cell 8), the original PFI framework recommended contracting to limit exposure, 
because this situation might lead to losing to imitators. In the case of enabling technologies too (cell 10), 
this is not so rosy a perspective. It is compensated partially by the fact that an enabling technology 
provides the opportunity to contract with a higher number of application sectors (i.e. contracting with 
broad horizontal scope). In line with this intuition, a recent stream of research has explored this business 
model of innovators focusing on licensing their enabling technology to the downstream manufacturers of 
products across settings—referred to as specialization in generality (Gambardella & McGahan, 2010; 
Conti et al., 2019a). Conti et al. (2019a) suggest and empirically test that when downstream entry is not 
                                                 
8 As before, an adequate or fair profit ensures that the innovation captures a sufficiently large share of the total surplus to 
incentivize continued investment in high-spillover and high-impact enabling technologies. 
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convenient, innovators may find it profitable to save resources by not entering downstream markets and 
specialize in licensing the enabling technology to the various downstream markets in which it can be 
applied. For example, in the early 1990s, a leading company such as IBM pulled out of the PC and other 
downstream markets to become a provider of general technological solutions, which was its major 
competence (Gerstner, 2002); many laser firms provide another similar example (Conti et al., 2019a). 
They also show that contracting an enabling technology is mostly appropriate when the innovator can 
contract its technology with a broad horizontal scope. 
To help innovators of enabling technologies navigating the complexity of these strategic options, 
we formally extend the PFI framework to the case of enabling technologies (Figure 3). The first question 
that an innovator should consider is whether the technology developed is discrete or enabling. If the 
former, the original PFI framework applies. If the latter, like in the original PFI framework, the next 
question concerns whether a dominant design for the enabling technology has emerged already. If not, 
waiting for the dominant design to emerge could still be the dominant strategy, except that, in the case of 
an enabling technology, the wait actually could never lead to an outcome due to the mentioned 
coordination failure that characterizes enabling technologies. Policy and regulatory support therefore 
would be needed to facilitate the process.  
-----Insert Figure 3 about here----- 
If a dominant design for the enabling technology has already emerged and the innovator possesses 
the critical complementary assets (or the resources to acquire them) in-house, the strategy of integration, 
with a broad horizontal scope—based on commercializing the technology in as many application sectors 
as possible—would be sensible and perhaps profitable.9 But for the vast majority of firms that cannot 
enjoy such fortunate position, the next key question concerns the strength of the appropriability regime in 
                                                 
9 The PFI framework suggested that complementary asset specialization tends to act as a protection mechanism against 
imitation: ownership of assets fine-tuned perfectly to the focal technology might be difficult to replicate. But because enabling 
technologies are—by definition—technologies more upgradable and adaptable than others, it is possible that they might not 
require to be used with specialized assets to the same extent of discrete technologies. So, asset specialization does not necessarily 
help the innovator of an enabling technology. 
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the focal industry. If it is high, the enabling technology potentially could be commercialized successfully 
via contracting it out.  
However, two additional questions that were not present in the PFI framework become relevant 
here. The first concerns the level of performance of the enabling technology compared to the alternative 
discrete technologies available in different settings (the abovementioned difference between VEi and VD). 
If the enabling technology performance in each individual setting (VEi) is particularly low compared to 
the performance of a discrete technology in the same setting (VD), profiting from innovation for the owner 
of the enabling technology could be more difficult. In Figure 2, we refer to this question as to “sufficient 
value of the enabling technology (compared to discrete one)?” 
Contracting out the technology as it is to buyer-firms across settings would be possible, but would 
be unlikely to generate high profits, because the technology would not be appealing to buyer-firms due to 
its lower value compared to discrete technologies in the same setting. The innovator could then go 
through many rounds of adaptation and fine-tuning to make it competitive with other discrete 
technologies in those settings. Depending on how expensive this process is, it could depress its 
profitability. An interesting example here is the case of complex (enabling) technologies (i.e., those 
characterized by many components and interdependencies among them). The cost of adapting a simpler 
(enabling) technology across different settings is likely to be low. This implies that contracting the 
technology across settings is likely to be a convenient option. But adapting a more complex enabling 
technology across settings would likely be more expensive, as complex technologies are characterized by 
many interdependent components, and their performance easily deteriorates if even only a handful aspects 
are missed (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Rivkin, 2000). It follows that profiting from complex enabling 
technologies might be problematic.  
Another relevant question concerns whether innovators with the enabling technology have 
complementary knowledge in the application sectors, which is meant to reflect their actual ability to 
exploit, monitor, and enforce appropriability across differing settings, as per our discussion on 
appropriability in section II. In Figure 2, we refer to this as to "complementary knowledge across 
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application sectors?" If innovators with an enabling technology lack these relevant skills, their ability to 
exploit the strength of the appropriability regime across settings will be low (rEi  decreases as i increases), 
and therefore licensing out the technology, especially in distant settings, might not result in reasonable 
profits. In anticipation of this, the enabling technology might not be developed in the first place.  
The two points above suggest that profiting from enabling technologies by contracting them out 
with a broad horizontal scope can more likely be a profitable strategy for innovators whose performance 
compares favorably to alternative discrete technologies and who have a large complementary knowledge 
base in application sectors. Focused innovators and innovators in technological contexts characterized 
instead by high complexity might need more support, irrespective of their size.  
Finally, when the appropriability regime is weak, complementary assets are not available, and cash 
resources are limited, a last concern for an innovator with an enabling technology is the extent to which 
imitators or competitors are in a relatively better position. If they are contracting with a narrow horizontal 
scope, partnering with a selected firm to access its assets is an available strategy. This strategy, though, is 
suboptimal, as profits would likely accrue more easily to the better-endowed partner; and, because of this, 
it might lead to a lower likelihood that the innovator develops the enabling technology in the first place. If 
the innovator instead is better positioned than competitors, commercializing the technology via 
integration could still be viable. But due to the innovator’s limited cash resources, integration in only a 
few settings would be possible (narrow horizontal scope). The latter is unlikely to be a winning strategy 
with an enabling technology. The innovator's profits are squeezed simultaneously by the lower value that 
can be offered (and, consequently, lower price that can be commanded) to the customers in each 
application sector and by the lower number of application sectors entered. 
The resulting comprehensive framework that emerges from our extension of the PFI framework to 
the case of enabling technologies does not only provide strategic guidance to the innovator of an enabling 
technology. It also provides guidance regarding the classes of innovators and technologies that might 
require regulatory and policy support. Importantly, Figure 3 shows that not only smaller innovators less 
endowed with cash resources (as in the original PFI framework) might find capturing sufficient value 
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from innovation difficult. Large, yet more knowledge-focused, innovators (which do not have 
complementary knowledge across settings and might therefore be less likely to exploit the strength of the 
appropriability regime as efficiently across settings) and innovators of more complex technologies (which 
require more adaptation and, therefore, higher costs to be applied across settings) might face substantial 
challenges in capturing value from enabling technologies. This implies that enabling technologies in those 
cases are less likely to be developed in the first place. To the extent that the contribution of these classes 
of innovators and technologies is important to public welfare, regulatory and policy support needs to be 
designed accordingly.  
V. Discussion and Implications 
Thirty years after its publication, the PFI framework has continued to have a considerable impact on the 
field of technology management. We focused on how PFI applies in the context of enabling technologies. 
Although previous studies have drawn attention to the importance of enabling technologies, they tend to 
focus on value creation rather than value capture. To our knowledge, our attempt to advance the PFI 
framework to the special context of enabling technologies has not been done before. 
Our main argument has been that, with enabling technologies, the nature of the technology and its 
application potential need to be considered with some granularity to illuminate idiosyncratic value-
capture issues, at least when compared to value-capture in the context of discrete technologies. We have 
elaborated on the special characteristics of profiting from enabling technologies, supported by illustrative 
evidence based on the analysis of data from the Patval survey. In this respect, the highlight of this paper 
from a strategic management perspective is that enabling technologies create a more uncertain and 
complex scenario for firms. In particular, the relationship between the strength of the legal appropriability 
regime and the commercialization choice does not hold uniformly for enabling technologies. Innovators 
with enabling technologies are likely less able to enjoy the benefits of a strong appropriability regime. We 
also suggested that even under a weak appropriability regime, the benefits of integration are effectively 
lower, because integration is likely to be limited by cash constraints for the owner of an enabling 
technology.  
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Building on these insights, we have offered an extension of Teece's (1986) original PFI framework 
to accommodate the important case of enabling technologies. This extended framework has clear 
implications for the design of business models and supporting strategies. PFI suggested that a key 
decision facing an innovator is whether to merely focus on the development and contracting of innovation 
with other firms, or rather to vertically expand the scope of its activities by incorporating its invention 
into a product and selling it to final consumers in the product market.  
Here we outlined how, in the case of enabling technologies, neither integration nor contracting are 
straightforward choices. Because of the breadth of opportunities offered by enabling technologies, broad 
integration is feasible for few innovators. Despite prior theoretical work having demonstrated that the 
unfolding of an enabling technology gives rise to increasing returns-to-scale (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 
1995), technological and regulatory forces, over time, have significantly reduced the diffusion and the 
role of dominant, highly diversified firms (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Arora, Belenzon & Patacconi, 
2018). It might also be argued that—in the real world—the size of an integrated firm's capability set is 
likely to be limited, despite its level of diversification. A strategy of integration with a broad horizontal 
scope would likely substitute "one myopic decision maker for a plurality of them," and inventive efforts 
could be therefore much more confined (Merges & Nelson, 1994, p.6). Whereas such a firm would have 
the internal incentives to develop this technology, it might not be sufficiently innovative downstream and 
could still benefit from the cross-fertilization that occurs via accessing other firms' complementary 
capabilities (Ahuja, Lampert & Novelli, 2013).10  
Licensing could be a way to address this issue and generate downstream technology contributions. 
Assuming a supportive judicial system, the breadth of applicability of an enabling technology might be 
able to compensate at least partially for the adverse effect of weak appropriability. When contracting with 
different downstream markets, licensors without regulatory or contractual obligations may be able to 
negotiate limited exclusivities with firms that don't compete among each other. The price that the 
                                                 
10 Kitch (1977) seems to believe otherwise, believing that having a sole player develop all the applications—without fear of 
external encroachment—is likely better. 
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licensees might be willing to pay for the technology will be enhanced (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2013). 
But we have already explained how this might still lead to underinvestment. Private and social returns 
need to equalize to incent the level of innovation that is right for society.11 
Overall, we believe that our paper has opened up new angles for understanding how to profit (and 
how to lose) from innovation. Our framework sheds light on some of the private challenges accruing to 
the innovators of enabling technologies. The policy implications of these private challenges are of 
fundamental importance. Policymakers must recognize that the economic contributions of enabling 
technologies for the economy can be high; but innovators face special challenges with respect to 
capturing enough value from their technologies, which implies they will tend to underinvest in such 
technologies without any government support and without appreciation and understanding by the courts.  
Interestingly, prior research has overlooked this question. The policy-oriented literature on patent 
scope, for instance, has generally associated a higher degree of appropriability to patents whose value was 
spanning multiple domains (e.g., Kitch, 1977; Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer 1990). This 
conclusion was derived from a variety of assumptions, such as that the costs of developing a technology 
spanning multiple domains were the same as the costs of developing a more dedicated one; that a more 
enabling technology could lead to more value capture by allowing the innovator to generate returns in 
multiple product markets; and that all innovators would have the capabilities and assets to profit equally 
in each of the related product markets (for a review, see Novelli, 2015). The assumptions made in the 
prior literature referenced in this paragraph do not necessarily hold, as illustrated in this paper.  
We hope this paper stimulates further reflections on whether government should incent and 
otherwise support investment in enabling technologies. Perhaps court should grant higher levels of 
protection to inventors of more (versus less) enabling technologies. Stronger patent protection enables the 
market for technology to work better and for open innovation (via licensing) models to flourish. 
Identifying mechanisms that can increase potential rewards to breakthrough innovators of enabling 
                                                 
11 See Mansfield et al. (1977) for a discussion of private and social returns to innovation. 
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technologies ought to lead to an increase in the generation of enabling technologies in the economy. This 
could potentially increase social welfare. Enabling technologies, like general purpose technologies, are 
precious to society, yet it is difficult for the innovator to capture a proportionate reward. A possible 
concern might be that broad patents might result in intellectual property protection that is too broad 
(Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). However, there is little evidence to suggest that patent thickets cannot be 
navigated (Barnett, 2017; Teece, 2017b). We hope our study stimulates further exploration of this subject 
and lays the groundwork for further improvements to the profiting from innovation framework and its 
related implications for both firm strategy and public policy. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Variable operationalization 
Variable Operationalization 
Enabling technology To distinguish between enabling and discrete technologies, we used the established patent's generality index 
elaborated by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2000). The measure is built based on two characteristics of the US 
patent system: (i) each patent is classified in a main technological class based on the technological domain to 
which the patented technology contributes; and (ii) every time a follow-up invention builds on a focal patent, the 
inventor of the follow-up invention is expected to cite the focal patent, originating in this way "a forward 
citation." Thus, the extent to which a patent is applicable across domains can be identified by measuring the 
dispersion of the patent's forward citations across technological classes: patents more broadly applicable will be 
more likely to receive forward citations across contexts as opposed to narrowly focused in one. Applying this 
logic to our context, we suggest that Hall et al.'s (2001) measure can provide an indication of the extent to which 
a patent is enabling in its nature. Hence, we followed these authors and employed the following process. For 
each of the US patent equivalents, we collected data on the forward citations it received and calculated the 
following measure: 
Generality= = (1 − ∑ (
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
)𝐽𝑗=1
2
) 𝑥 
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖−1
  
where Ni denotes the number of forward citations to a patent, and Nij is the number received from patents in 
class j (at the IPC main-classes level of analysis). The measure includes an adjustment for the natural downward 
bias that might occur when the total number of citations to a patent is small (Hall, 2005).  
Finally, we calculated the median of the generality for all patents in our sample and classified as "enabling 
technologies" those patents having a generality higher than the sample median; and as "discrete" (not enabling 
technologies) those patents reporting a generality score lower or equal to the median. 
Dependent variables 
Contract (selling or 
licensing the 
technology) 
Dummy variable valued 1 based on whether the response to either one of the following questions of the Patval 
survey was equal to "Yes": "Has this patent been licensed by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent 
party?”; “Was the ownership right to the patent sold to another party not related to the original owner(s) or 
applicant(s)?"  
Integration Dummy variable valued 1 in case of a positive response to the following question of the Patval survey (and 0 
otherwise): "Have the applicant(s) or affiliated parties ever used this patented invention commercially, i.e., in a 
product, service, or manufacturing process?"  
Independent variables 
Strength of the 
appropriability 
regime 
Index at the industry-country level. We obtained industry-level appropriability strength data from the Carnegie 
Mellon Survey (Cohen et al,. 2000) and country-level appropriability strength data of the Fraser Institute Index 
on the quality of different countries' national legal systems. For each inventor in the sample, we identify the 
main industry and the country of reference of the invention from the Patval survey. The variable strength of the 
appropriability regime was calculated as the product of the strength of the appropriability regime in the industry 
and country of reference of the inventor.  
Availability of 
complementary 
assets 
Dummy variable valued 1 based on whether both responses to the following items of the Patval survey were 
higher than 4 on a 5-point scale: "Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about the organization in which the invention was made: The organization had all the 
complementary resources to make the invention a technical success; The organization had all the resources to 
turn the invention into something economically valuable (e.g., new product, process or something else)." 
Paradigmatic phase Dummy variable valued 1 in case of a positive response to the following question of the Patval survey (and 0 
otherwise): "Does this invention utilize or build upon technical standards, such as those published by ISO or an 
industry association?" The variable took value 1 in case of a positive response; 0, otherwise. 
Controls 
Inventor age Logarithm of the inventor's age at the time of the invention; obtained from the Patval survey. 
Inventor experience Number of years elapsed between the inventor’s first invention and the focal priority date; obtained from the 
Patval survey. 
Inventor employed Dummy variable valued 1 if the inventor was employed at the time of the invention, 0 otherwise; obtained from 
the Patval survey. 
Patent granted Dummy variable valued 1 if the patent had been granted already, 0 otherwise. Obtained from the Patval survey. 
US patent Dummy variable valued 1 if the country of the invention is the US. Obtained from the Patval survey. 
Organization age 
dummies 
Dummy variables indicating the age of the organization the employee was affiliated with at the time of the 
invention, as classified in four categories: "<5 yrs," "5-10 yrs," "11-20 yrs," ">20 yrs"; obtained from the Patval 
survey. 
Economic value 
dummies 
Dummy variables for the economic value of the patent, based on the classification of the patent into four 
categories depending on the answer to the following question of the Patval survey: "In comparison with other 
patents in your industry or technological field, how would you rate the economic value of this patent? 1.Top 
10%; 2. Top 25%, but not top 10%; 3. Top 50%, but not top 25%; 4. Bottom 50%." 
Year dummies Dummy variables indicating the year in which the patent was filed; obtained from the Patval survey. 
Organization size 
dummies  
Dummy variables indicating the size of the organization with which the employee was affiliated at the time of 
the invention, based on the number of employees of the firm with which the inventor was affiliated, classified 
into the following categories: "1-49 employees," "50-99 employees," "100-249 employees," "250-499 
employees," "500-999 employees," "1000-4999 employees," "5000 and more employees"; obtained from the 
Patval survey. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics and pairwise correlations   
Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Contract 7,290 0.086 0.281 0.000 1.000 1.000 
         
2 Integration 7,290 0.471 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.112 1.000 
        
3 Availability of 
complementary assets 
7,290 0.445 0.497 0.000 1.000 -0.031 0.166 1.000 
       
4 Strength of the 
appropriability regime 
7,290 14.563 2.337 6.136 23.477 -0.008 -0.030 0.053 1.000 
      
5 Paradigmatic Phase 7,290 0.165 0.371 0.000 1.000 0.025 0.100 0.040 -0.044 1.000 
     
6 Inventor age 7,290 3.741 0.228 2.833 4.431 0.092 0.017 0.079 -0.011 0.015 1.000 
    
7 Inventor experience 7,290 11.360 9.562 0.000 61.000 0.068 0.007 0.022 -0.010 -0.011 0.668 1.000 
   
8 Inventor employed 7,290 0.944 0.230 0.000 1.000 -0.104 -0.031 0.035 0.047 -0.011 -0.157 -0.145 1.000 
  
9 Patent granted 7,290 0.357 0.479 0.000 1.000 -0.015 0.075 0.041 0.022 -0.024 -0.017 -0.025 0.004 1.000 
 
10 US patent 7,290 0.250 0.433 0.000 1.000 0.074 -0.007 0.107 -0.079 0.016 0.272 0.151 0.001 -0.151 1.000 
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Table 3. Bivariate probit model on the probability of commercializing the technology via contract 
and/or via integration  
  Full Sample Discrete technologies Enabling technologies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Contract  Integration Contract  Integration Contract Integration 
Strength of the appr. regime 0.035*** -0.018*** 0.050*** -0.024*** 0.022 -0.012  
(0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) 
Availability of 
complementary assets 
0.891*** 0.436*** 0.884** 0.419*** 0.897** 0.463*** 
 
(0.276) (0.031) (0.392) (0.044) (0.394) (0.044) 
Availability of 
complementary assets X 
Strength of the appr. regime 
-0.068*** 
 
-0.070*** 
 
-0.067**  
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.027)  
Paradigmatic phase 0.078 0.304*** 0.106 0.217*** 0.053 0.426*** 
 
(0.057) (0.041) (0.077) (0.055) (0.086) (0.062) 
Inventor age 0.454*** -0.068 0.527*** -0.118 0.361* -0.037 
 
(0.133) (0.092) (0.192) (0.132) (0.188) (0.131) 
Inventor experience 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Employed -0.008 -0.006 0.138 0.109 -0.184 -0.156 
 
(0.091) (0.076) (0.132) (0.104) (0.127) (0.111) 
Patent granted 0.005 0.187*** 0.030 0.167*** -0.014 0.205*** 
 
(0.047) (0.032) (0.067) (0.045) (0.067) (0.045) 
US 0.187*** -0.033 0.154** -0.057 0.229*** 0.003 
 
(0.051) (0.038) (0.073) (0.053) (0.073) (0.054) 
Organization age dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Economic value dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Organization size dummies  Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -3.186*** 0.137 -3.612*** -0.310 -2.718*** 0.563 
 (0.597) (0.427) (0.865) (0.636) (0.836) (0.602) 
       
Observations 7,290 7,290 3,661 3,661 3,629 3,629 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4. Marginal effects  
  Full Sample Discrete technologies Enabling technologies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Contract  Integration Contract  Integration Contract Integration 
       
Strength of the appr. regime 
if complementary assets =0 
0.005*** -0.007*** 0.008*** -0.009*** 0.003 -0.004 
Strength of the appr. regime 
if complementary assets =1 
-0.004** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.006** -0.004 
Complementary assets if 
strength appr. regime = min 
0.068*** 0.165*** 0.055* 0.158*** 0.081* 0.174*** 
Complementary assets if 
strength appr. regime = max 
-0.106*** 0.162*** -0.126*** 0.153*** -0.087** 0.173*** 
Paradigmatic phase 0.012 0.114*** 0.016 0.081*** 0.008 0.158*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Innovator’s strategies to profit from discrete and enabling technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal Scope of Commercialization
Vertical Scope of 
Commercialization 
(Original PFI)
Contract (licensing or selling the 
technology)
Integrate (the technology 
into products)
Narrow 
(targeting one or a few 
application sectors)
Broad 
(targeting many or all 
possible application sectors)
T
M2 M3 Mn
T
T [rE1VE1]
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v. Integrate (with narrow horizontal scope)
iii. Contract (with narrow horizontal scope) iv. Contract (with broad horizontal scope)
vi. Integrate (with broad horizontal scope)ii. Integrate
i.Contract
VD=Total value of the vertical chain
rD=share accruing to the innovator 
(rD=1 in the case of integration)
T=technology development
M=embodiment of the 
technology into products
VE1, VE2, VE3 ,… VEn =total value in each vertical chain
rE1, rE2, rE3,… rEn =share accruing to the innovator for 
each vertical chain 
(rE=1 in the case of integration)
…
…
Dashed lines characterize contracting
Solid lines characterize integration
Grey lines characterize settings that the innovators could 
potentially target but have chosen not to
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Figure 2. Contract and integration strategies and outcomes for innovators. This is adapted from 
Figure 11 in Teece (1986).  
 
 
Strong legal/ technical appropriability Weak legal/technical appropriability
Innovator excellently positioned versus imitators 
with respect to commissioning complementary 
assets
Innovator poorly positioned versus 
imitators with respect to commissioning 
complementary assets
Innovators and imitators advantageously 
positioned vis a vis independent owners of 
complementary assets
1. Discrete technology=
Contract: Innovator will win.
5. Discrete and enabling technology= 
Contract: Innovator should win.
6. Discrete and enabling technology= 
Contract: Innovator or imitator will win; 
asset owners won't benefit.
2. Enabling technology=
Contract: But innovator's ability to exploit the 
strength of the appropriability regime might be 
lower for applications that are far from its core 
knowledge domain or that are not yet known.
Innovators and imitators disadvantageously 
positioned vis a vis independent owners of 
complementary assets
3. Discrete technology=
Contract if can do so on competitive terms; 
integrate if necessary: Innovator should win; may 
have to share profits with asset holder.
7. Discrete technology= 
Integrate: Innovator should win.
8. Discrete technology= 
Contract (to limit exposure): Innovator will 
gradually lose to imitators and/or asset 
holders.
4. Enabling technology=
Contract: But, as above, innovator's ability to 
exploit the strength of the appropriability regime 
might be lower, and this is worsened by the weak 
position vis a vis independent owners of assets. 
Yet, compared to the case of a discrete 
technology (3), the innovator with an enabling 
technology can choose among multiple 
application sectors that can be targeted, possibly 
improving the odds for the innovator.
9. Enabling technology= 
Integrate in as many application sectors as cash 
constraints allow (“integrate with broad 
horizontal scope”). Due to cash constraints, 
integration in only a few domains is more likely. 
But it might lead the innovator to lose to firms 
with a discrete technology that might be able to 
create more value for users in each application 
sector.
10. Enabling technology= 
Contract targeting multiple-application 
sectors to limit exposure (contract with 
broad horizontal scope). Innovator may 
gradually lose to imitators, but might be 
able to compensate at least to some extent 
by exploiting the broad applicability of the 
technology, which provides more 
opportunities of returns.
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Figure 3. Revised PFI framework. Flow chart for integration versus contract decision in the case of discrete and enabling technologies.  
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